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1.  Who we are 
The authors of this interim report on the ESRC ‘Beyond Contagion’ project are John Drury (University of 
Sussex), Roger Ball (Keele University and University of Sussex), Fergus Neville (University of St Andrews), 
Stephen Reicher (University of St Andrews), and Clifford Stott (Keele University). We are a group of social 
psychologists and a historian who have been researching crowds, riots and other forms of collective behaviour for 
over 30 years. Others involved in the project include Linda Bell, Mikey Biddlestone, Andrea Boardman, Sanj 
Choudhury, Tomas Hajek, Philipp Jabold, Thomas Johnson, Max Lovell, Cassie Lowery, Evans Ndiema, Becca 
Phillips, Shuqi Quan, Caoimhe Ryan, Anna Breian Tskhovrebova, Tam Vo, Clement Yeung (all Sussex, St 
Andrews, or Keele), and Daniel Richardson (UCL). 
The research described in this interim report was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research 
Council (grant number ES/N01068X/1) to John Drury, Clifford Stott and Stephen Reicher. We would like to 
thank Tim Newburn (LSE) for access to the Guardian/LSE ‘Reading the Riots’ interview dataset, Trevor Adams of 
the Metropolitan Police Service for assistance with access to crime data, and Rob Procter and Hamish Lacmane
(both Warwick University) for assistance with harvesting Twitter data. We are also grateful to the following 
people who have supported us by sitting on our Advisory Group: David Waddington (Sheffield Hallam 
University), Betsy Stanko OBE, and Chief Supt Owen West. 
More about this project, who we are, and our other work on crowds and riots can be found here: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/beyondcontagion 
As this is an interim report, some of the findings reported here have not yet been through peer review. Where 
there is a published source, this is indicated. 
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2. Executive summary
2.1 Background to the 2011 riots
• While an extraordinary amount has been written and said about the 2011 English riots, very little has been 
based on systematic evidence. The present interim report summarizes findings so far from a research 
programme based on a comprehensive data-set, which seeks to develop a new way of talking and thinking 
about the process by which riots spread from location to location. 
• Some of the dominant accounts of the riots - as mindless destruction or ‘criminality pure and simple’1 -
obscure understanding and feed into flawed policy responses. 
• This study drew upon multiple archive sources, interviews with rioters (gathered as part of the Guardian/LSE 
Reading the Riots project), contextual information about riot locations, and police crime data. We used these 
data to construct histories of some of the most significant riots in August 2011, to test predictive models, and 
to analyse participants’ experiences. 
2.2 Myths of the riots
• The idea that those who participated were overwhelmingly convicted criminals or that their actions were 
typically indiscriminate are not supported by the Home Office’s data. 
• Like many other riots, the rioting in Tottenham happened after a drawn-out process rather than a single 
‘spark’. In each location, conflict with the police and power-reversal in a local deprived estate was often the 
point at which smaller skirmishes became a mass event. 
2.3 Motives for the riots 
• There were significant differences between London boroughs that saw rioting and those that did not. 
Immediately prior to the riots, the former had significantly more deprivation, many more police ‘stop and 
searches’, and more negative attitudes to the police. 
• We found that anti-police sentiment among participants was a significant factor in who joined in and what 
they did.  One reason given for this hostility was experiences of ‘stop and search’ in the community. 
• Shared anti-police sentiment formed the basis of a common identity, superseding ‘postcode rivalries’, and 
enabling coordinated action against police targets. 
• In addition, many people saw themselves in opposition to a societal system they perceived as unjust and 
illegitimate; this made looting acceptable to many of them. 
2.4 Understanding the spread of the riots 
• To explain waves of riots, in place of the concept of ‘contagion’ - the notion that people simply copied others 
in a mindless and automatic way - we propose a new model of riot spread as identity-based collective 
empowerment. 
• Rioting spread in various different ways. The first spread - from Tottenham High Road to Tottenham Hale 
and Wood Green - occurred as police dispersed rioters yet were unable to prevent their actions. 
• Here and elsewhere, there was a pattern whereby community or anti-police rioting was the basis of 
subsequent commodity rioting (involving looting) as well as attacks on wealth. 
• Close examination of the spread of rioting from North to South London suggests that Brixton participants 
often identified with Tottenham, and were influenced to riot out of anger and a sense of injustice at the killing 
of Mark Duggan. This would explain why Brixton was the first place to riot in South London. 
• Many more of those in Croydon and Clapham, however, were more influenced by the perception of police 
vulnerability across London. The impact of police vulnerability in providing ‘vicarious’ empowerment for 
those who identified as anti-police may have been a general process, explaining riot spread across England. 
• In all the locations we looked at, local identities and networks mediated the impact of rioting in other 
locations: most people interviewed were influenced by what they thought relevant others locally were 
prepared to do. 
• Some police tactics seem to have inadvertently facilitated spread to different locations. These tactics included 
clearing town centres of shoppers and using proactive methods in those locations they feared would riot. 
1 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2011/aug/09/david-cameron-riots-criminality-video 
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3. Introduction 
An extraordinary amount has been written and said 
about the 2011 riots. Unfortunately, much of this is 
speculation and is based on a lack of evidence. This is 
true of both most of the academic publications on the 
riots (over 150 journal articles, chapters and books at 
the last count) but also of the various policy-related 
claims and initiatives that followed the events. What 
is especially disturbing about the UK government’s 
numerous claims about causation and their hastily-
assembled policy initiatives is that these are not just 
abstract ideas but have real consequences for people’s 
lives.
First there was the claim by government that the riots 
were led by ‘gangs’, and the hastily proposed 
appointment of a US ‘Gangs Tzar’ as the solution to 
this.2 Then there was the ‘Troubled Families’ 
programme which was rushed out based on 
assumptions that family upbringing led young people 
to grow into the ‘career criminals’ supposedly behind 
the riots.3 Next, in the face of the evidence from the 
Guardian/Reading the Riots project that ‘stop and 
search’ was a major grievance for many of those 
involved in the riots, as well as the police’s own 
evidence that its effectiveness is minimal,4 the 
‘solution’ to knife-crime is... once again to increase 
‘stop and search’.5 Finally, the ‘Gangs Matrix’ 
programme designed to combat gang violence 
following the riots has now been discredited as 
racist.6 
In writing the present interim report, we have taken 
the opposite approach to the UK government in many 
respects. A first key message of this report, 
therefore, is that evidence is needed in understanding the 
2011 riots. This report is based on a comprehensive 
data-set and multi-method analysis; it summarizes the 
results of a series of studies that have been, or are in 
the process of being, submitted for publication via 
peer review. 
A second key message is that to depict the riots as simply 
mindless, purely criminal, or as meaningless obscures 
understanding. Years of research on riots has 
demonstrated that they are typically characterized by 
meaningful patterns, and it is the job of researchers to 
uncover and explain these patterns. This empirical 
approach puts rioting back into context, seeks to 
examine the social experience and understandings of 
rioters, and how we respond when we see others 
rioting. This is not about approving or disapproving of 
the riots, or about diminishing the seriousness of what 
happened; it is about better understanding so as to be 
better able to diagnose why they occur.
A third key message is that existing accounts of the 2011 
riots fail to explain the pattern of spread. Like many 
urban riots, the 2011 events occurred in a wave. Yet 
not all places in the UK were affected. We need to 
explain why some places rioted and others do not; 
and for those places that did riot, we need to explain 
the sequence of events. 
Our fourth and final key message, connecting the 
previous three, is that we need a new way of talking and 
thinking about these and other riots, based around the 
concept of shared social identity.  The depictions of 
rioting as a meaningless outburst, purely reflecting 
flaws in the crowd (and therefore denying any social 
causation), are encapsulated in the notion of 
‘contagion’. Thus it is not only a lack of evidence, but 
a particular (loaded) discourse that obscures and 
distorts riots, that suggests false ‘solutions’, that 
draws attention away from deeper causes of these 
important events. Shared social identity - the sense of 
who ‘we’ are and our definition of proper and 
possible action in relation to others - is a concept that 
has been usefully employed to understand many 
forms of collective action, including riots,7 in peer-
reviewed research going back over 30 years. We 
argue that it provides an insightful framework for 
understanding key elements of urban riots. 
Urban riots can have significant economic and 
political impacts on a society, as well as profound 
psychological impacts on those that experience them.
2 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/aug/11/new-gangs-drive-signalled In fact, the government very quickly abandoned 
claims that ‘gangs’ were responsible for the riots in the face of a lack of evidence for such claims. See Ball, R., & Drury. J. (2012). 
Representing the riots: The (mis)use of statistics to sustain ideological explanation. Radical Statistics, 106, 4-21. 
3 This programme was subsequently shown to be ineffective: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/aug/08/13bn-troubled-
families-scheme-has-had-no-discernible-impact
4 https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/SS_and_crime_report.pdf
5 https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/nov/11/uk-police-chiefs-hold-talks-to-expand-stop-and-search Increasing ‘stop and search’ 
has been proposed not only by police chiefs but also by the London Mayor. 
6 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/21/metropolitan-police-gangs-matrix-review-london-mayor-discriminatory
7 See Reicher, S. D. (1984). The St Pauls riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 1-21. 
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4. Background: Riots and the events of August 2011 
Waves of riots tell us about deep societal problems 
and widespread alienation. This is why we have to 
listen to them and this is why we need to engage with 
them with a new discourse. This interim report is a 
modest contribution to that new form of discourse.
The report is structured as follows. First we provide 
some background to the events and the dominant 
The English riots of 2011 occurred over five days in 
August, and involved an estimated 20,000 people, 
with more than 5,000 arrests and costs of up to £500 
million.8 It was the largest wave of riots in the UK 
since the 1980s and the most prolonged and 
widespread in London since the 1780 Gordon riots.9
The first rioting took place in Tottenham, two days 
after the fatal shooting by police of a local mixed-
heritage man, Mark Duggan. Over the next 24 hours, 
rioting spread to other areas of London, and the next 
day to many other cities in England. Altogether 85 
locations in 53 local authority areas were affected by 
disorder. 
4.1 Three pseudo-explanations for 
riots and rioting 
In mass media accounts and a number of government 
statements, three types of myths about riots were 
presented to characterize the events of 2011. These 
myths, which have a long history in public discourse 
about riots, can be summarized as ‘the bad’, ‘the mad’, 
and ‘the bad leading the mad’: 
• The bad. One of the most well-rehearsed 
(non)explanations of riots is that they are caused 
simply by a convergence of criminal individuals, 
or ‘riff-raff’, who are not sufficiently socialised, or 
who come from ‘problem families’. 
• The mad. This kind of explanation suggests that 
otherwise ordinary people become mindless and 
out of control when immersed in a crowd, 
evidenced by their supposedly indiscriminate 
‘conversation’ around these riots and riots in general. 
Next, we describe our methods and data. The rest of 
the report is organized around the main findings so far 
from our research, covering the predictors, 
experiences, and dynamics of the events, and focusing 
specifically on the question of how riots spread. 
Finally we draw out some implications of this 
analysis. 
violence. In this account, rioting spreads easily 
through ‘contagion’ and ‘copycat’ behaviour. 
• The bad leading the mad. This account combines the 
first two, by suggesting that  powerful ‘agitators’ 
(or sometimes ‘gangs’) manipulate and exploit the 
gullible masses. 
At one level these are different kinds of explanations -
the first blames individuals, the second blames crowd 
psychology. But at another level they are similar, for 
what they have in common is the idea that the 
problem of riots lies with the rioters. These 
explanations serve to remove blame from anything or 
anybody outside the crowd: the actions of authorities, 
the policies of governments, inequalities or injustices 
in society. In the 1960s, for example, after the wave 
of urban riots against racism and police brutality in 
the United States, those in authority tried to argue 
that these events were unrepresentative of wider 
society, that only a small minority of ‘marginal’ or 
‘riot-prone’ individuals were involved, and that the 
correct solution was increased use of coercion rather 
than measures to address inequalities in society.10
Over the years, evidence has amassed against these 
explanations.11 Thus, the idea that rioters are 
typically marginal is flatly contradicted by evidence 
from the 1960s urban riots which showed that rioters 
were representative of their communities (and if 
anything slightly better educated than others).12 The 
notion that rioting is mindless and rioters’ behaviour 
typically indiscriminate has been contradicted by 
evidence from historians and social scientists on some 
8 Riots, Communities and Victims Panel. (2011). 5 Days in August – An interim report on the 2011 English riots. 
9 Kawalerowicz, J., &, Biggs, M. (2015). Anarchy in the UK: Economic deprivation, social disorganization, and political grievances in the 
London riot of 2011. Social Forces, 94, 673-698. 
10 Fogelson, R. M. (1971). Violence as protest: A study of riots and ghettos. New York: Anchor 
11 For a summary of the evidence, see Reicher, S., & Stott, C. (2011). Mad mobs and Englishmen? Myths and realities of the 2011 riots. 
Hachette. 
12 Fogelson (1971) op. cit. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968). Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders. New York. 
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of the most violent crowd events, including the Watts 
riot of 1965, where there was selectivity of targets 
based on shared norms and values.13 And the idea that 
people in a crowd are so gullible that anyone with the 
right rhetoric can sway them to act in any direction 
has been contradicted again by the extensive 
programme of research on the US riots of the 
1960s.14 On this point, numerous field studies and 
experiments show that leadership is a function of 
shared identity between crowd and leader; for 
influence to occur, the ‘influencer’ must be seen as 
ingroup to us and the actions they persuade us to take 
must be in line with our shared norms and values.15
We will describe below how our evidence from the 
2011 riots also contradicts these and other pseudo-
explanations. Our main focus is one particular idea 
which encapsulates many feature of these myths (i.e., 
pathology, mindlessness, meaninglessness of actions): 
contagion.
4.2 What’s wrong with ‘contagion’?
The concept of ‘contagion’ is one of the most popular 
in social science, and is commonly employed to 
describe the spread of both simple behaviours (such as 
scratching, yawning, and smiling) as well as complex 
social phenomena, such as market ‘panic’ - and 
rioting. ‘Contagion’ is the idea that behaviours spread 
simply through exposure or contact (literal or 
metaphorical). The term comes from the Latin words
‘con’ meaning ‘together with’ and ‘tagere’ meaning ‘to 
touch’. 
One of the earliest usages of the term ‘contagion’ in a 
social science context was by the psycho-historian 
Hippolyte Taine, who borrowed concepts from 
medicine (including ‘feverishness’ and ‘delirium’) to 
describe what he saw as the primitive psychology of 
crowds.16 For Taine and the other ‘crowd scientists’ 
in nineteenth century Europe - most notably Gustave 
Le Bon - the revolutions in France, increased 
urbanization, and industrial unrest each represented 
the threat of the ‘mass’ to civilization. Therefore the 
aim of their ‘science’ was not only to understand the 
crowd but to combat it. The concept of ‘contagion’ 
was one of the weapons in this assault on the crowd. 
Le Bon defined ‘contagion’ as a form of uncritical 
social influence whereby any behaviour or sentiment 
sweeps through the crowd, and he advised authorities 
on how to harness the malleability of the ‘masses’ to 
strengthen the old regime against the threat of 
democracy. 
Clearly, therefore, the choice of the term ‘contagion’ 
to talk about social influence in crowds was not 
accidental. More neutral words such as 
‘transmission’, ‘spread’ or ‘influence’ were rejected 
for a term that compared influence to a disease, that 
suggested that it was mindless, and that therefore 
implied that it was bad. 
Today the concept of ‘contagion’ has gone far beyond 
its early beginnings in ‘crowd science’, but its 
association with primitive psychology is still strong. 
Its specific prediction is that mere exposure alone 
leads to spread of behaviour, something which occurs 
at a ‘basic’ level, ‘beneath’ cognition. Yet even 
studies of the most elementary responses provide 
evidence that the story is not so simple. People don’t 
imitate uncritically; they evaluate the information, in 
particular its self-relevance, and this determines the 
action they take. 
This point was nicely illustrated in an experiment on 
‘emotional contagion’, which is supposedly 
automatic. The experiment showed that people were 
more likely to mimic the (angry, fearful) emotional 
reactions of a target who was ‘ingroup’ than one who 
was ‘outgroup’.17 Our own experiments on social 
influence are not yet published, yet their pattern of 
results is remarkably similar to this finding. 
First, we looked at scratching, which has previously 
been found to be extremely ‘contagious’. As well as 
observing their behaviour, we measured people’s 
identification with particular social groups we made 
salient (e.g., students). We found that, for those 
people who identified strongly with the group, seeing 
a fellow ingroup member scratching was likely to 
make them feel itchy, and this itchiness predicted the 
number of times they scratched themselves. We 
found almost exactly the same pattern of results with 
yawning, which has been said to be the most 
primitively ‘contagious’ behaviour of them all. 
Finally, in a group maze task, we found that, rather 
than mindlessly following anyone, participants were 
more likely to follow those they were told were their 
ingroup members. 
13 Fogelson (1971) op. cit.
14 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) op. cit.
15 Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Platow, M. J. (2010). The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power. Psychology Press.
16 Stott, C., & Drury, J. (2017). Contemporary understanding of riots: Classical crowd psychology, ideology and the social identity
approach. Public Understanding of Science, 26, 2–14.  
17 Van der Schalk, J., Fischer, A., Doosje, B., Wigboldus, D., Hawk, S., Rotteveel, M., & Hess, U. (2011). Convergent and divergent 
responses to emotional displays of ingroup and outgroup. Emotion, 11, 286-298. 
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5. The need for evidence: Our methods 
Evidence that mere exposure is insufficient for 
behavioural spread, and that identity matters, 
problematize the ‘contagion’ concept. If just seeing a 
yawn doesn’t after all automatically make us yawn, 
we need to look at how people think about what they 
are exposed to and its relevance to them and to the 
identities that are important to them.  
In our study of the 2011 riots, we sought to utilise 
data from as many sources as possible in order to 
provide the most comprehensive analysis. 
5.1 ‘Reading the Riots’ interviews
We had access to the Guardian/LSE Reading the Riots18
interview data-set that was gathered in the months 
immediately after the events in 2011. A team of 17 
interviewers used local contacts to recruit people 
involved in the riots, the majority of whom had not at 
that point been arrested. There were 270 such 
transcripts, which were redacted to remove 
identifying information. 
5.2 Contemporaneous and archive data 
We made use of over 150 newspaper sources, over 
40 official reports, over 100 journal articles, over 250 
videos (including both footage and interviews), a 
database of 2.6 million riot-related tweets, seven field 
trips, and hundreds of photographs. 
5.3 Police data 
We had access to the Home Office compilation of 
police data on arrestees and criminal offences during 
the riots, as well as more detailed data-sets from a 
number of individual police forces. This comprised 
data on over 5,000 offences and over 4,000 arrestees. 
5.5 Methods of analysis 
This comprehensive data-set enabled us to do three 
things. First, it allowed us to construct a detailed 
objective description of some of the major riots in
Of course, the spread of rioting is a much more 
complex phenomenon than scratching or yawning. 
This is why, in order to develop a new way of talking 
and thinking about the spread of behaviour in this 
context, we needed an appropriate methodology. 
August 2011. To substantiate the veracity of the 
timing, location, and content of a particular incident, 
we triangulated three types of information: post-
event accounts by participants and eye-witnesses; 
real-time media recorded during the events; and 
physical evidence of the actions of the crowd. To 
date, we have produced detailed triangulated 
accounts of the riots in Haringey borough 
(Tottenham, Tottenham Hale, and Wood Green),19
Enfield,20 Brixton, Clapham, Croydon borough, 
Salford, Manchester city centre, and Birmingham. In 
each case, we constructed a detailed timeline which 
formed the basis of the detailed descriptive account.
Second, our comprehensive data-set enabled us to 
develop predictive models of some of the factors 
behind some of the pattern of events. Here we made 
particular use of the police crime data as dependent 
measures, but also included a number of other 
predictor variables. 
Third, we analysed participants’ interview accounts 
so that we could examine their experiences of events, 
to complement the objective evidence. The subjective 
accounts of participants allows us to explore their 
understandings and feelings to determine why things 
happened. For this, we used thematic analysis to 
examine patterns of meaning in the transcripts. 
The points below are a summary and distillation of 
the results so far of these different methodological 
techniques and strategies. 
18 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/series/reading-the-riots
19 https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=full-triangulated-account---haringey.pdf&site=557
20 https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=full-triangulated-account---enfield.pdf&site=557
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6. What drove the riots?
6.1 Beyond ‘pure criminality’
We have shown21 that the statistics that the then 
Prime Minister and other senior politicians used to 
support their claim that the 2011 riots were 
‘criminality pure and simple’22 were highly 
problematic: 
‘Criminal’ and ‘criminality’ were amongst the 
most frequently occurring words used to refer 
to the UK riots.23 On the one hand, as a 
description of illegal activities the term 
‘criminal’ was clearly technically correct. On 
the other hand, a different kind of claim was 
made, particularly by senior politicians, when 
it was stated that most of those who took part 
already had criminal records and convictions 
(and thus were already ‘criminals’). This kind 
of claim included statements about the 
‘hardcore’ made by the Justice Secretary 
Kenneth Clarke in September 2011: 
‘It's not yet been widely recognised, but the hardcore 
of the rioters were in fact known criminals. Close to 
three quarters of those aged 18 or over charged with 
riot offences already had a prior conviction…In my 
view, the riots can be seen in part as an outburst of 
outrageous behaviour by the criminal classes –
individuals and families familiar with the justice 
system, who haven't been changed by their past 
punishments.’24
Home Secretary Theresa May continued with 
this characterization of the ‘majority’ in a 
speech given in December 2011: 
‘…three-quarters of those who appeared in court in 
connection with the riots already had a previous 
caution or conviction. On average each rioter 
charged had committed 11 previous offences. In 
other words, they were career criminals’25
A serious issue, however, was that the figures on 
which these statements were based were arrest figures. 
Several police sources indirectly drew attention to the 
problems in using these figures to characterise the 
composition of the ‘rioting’ crowds in August 2011, 
when they acknowledged the pressure they were 
under to make arrests.26 We argued:
Clearly, such pressure was leading to the path 
of least resistance in terms of sweeping up 
possible suspects. This involved concentrating 
on those who were already within police 
databases and/or under investigation and fitted 
the criminal profile of a potential ‘rioter’ or 
‘looter’ in a particular area...
Public statements that most rioters were 
already ‘criminals’ treated as unproblematic 
the circular way that the data was produced, 
with those already known to the police most 
likely to be identified and arrested. This simple 
statistical flaw did not restrain politicians from 
knowingly (or unknowingly) using the data to 
both characterise the August riots and define 
policy responses.27
6.2 There were significant differences 
between those locations in London 
that saw rioting and those that did not 
We compared London boroughs that saw rioting (26) 
with those that did not (6).28 We looked at different 
predictors and different measures of the extent of 
rioting, to get a fuller picture of some of the 
underlying factors. 
6.2.1 Deprivation was the strongest predictor 
of whether a riot occurred in a London 
borough29
There were significantly greater numbers of deprived 
people in the boroughs that saw rioting than in those
21 Ball & Drury (2012) op. cit.
22 http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/08/prime-minister-communities
23 Reicher & Stott (2011) op. cit.
24 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/05/kenneth-clarke-riots-penal-system
25 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2075540/Theresa-May-lessons-SHE-learnt-weeks-LSE-report-summer-riots.html 18-12-
2011
26 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/08/boy-riots-arrested-tv-cameras
27 Ball & Drury (2012) op. cit.
28 We excluded the City of London from this analysis. 
29 The measures we used here were the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation overall score, plus the proportion of a local authority district’s 
population living in the most deprived LSOAs in the country.
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that did not see rioting. In addition, the greater 
numbers of deprived people in a borough, the greater 
the number of recorded riot offences in a borough30 and 
the longer the duration of rioting within a borough.  
6.2.2 The boroughs with more ‘stop and search’ 
in the two-and-a-half years beforehand were 
those more likely to see rioting in August 201131
Just to illustrate this point, the population-adjusted 
average number of ‘stop and searches’ in 2010 in the 
boroughs that saw rioting was 8,442 per 100,000 
population, which was more than double the average 
number (4,141) for those boroughs that didn’t see 
rioting.32
6.2.3 Prior attitudes to policing predicted 
number of riots per borough
Attitudes to policing were measured in a 2011 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) survey that 
sampled 9,660 people in all the London boroughs in 
the months before the August riots. Public attitudes 
that the MPS did not treat people with respect and 
did not engage well with all members of the 
community were the strongest predictor of the 
number of riots per borough. These same public 
attitudes, plus another part of the survey measuring 
the extent to which the public felt they had control 
over local policing, were major predictors of the 
number of recorded riot offences in a borough.33 In other 
words, those boroughs in which people saw the police 
negatively and felt alienated from them were those 
that later saw the most rioting. 
6.3 Anti-police sentiments were pivotal 
While Reading the Riots and other previous research 
has documented widespread anti-police feeling among 
2011 rioters,34 our analysis adds to this by suggesting 
that rioters used their views of the police to define 
themselves collectively. As we show, these shared anti-
police views also (a) enabled people to act
collectively; (b) were the basis of ‘vicarious’ 
empowerment (i.e., people empowered by police 
vulnerability in other locations); and (c) hence were 
an important mechanism of the spread of rioting 
between locations. 
6.3.1 Hostility to the police was shared; it 
formed a shared identity for many people
Many interviewees expressed long-standing anti-
police feelings or attitudes. For example, the majority 
of interviewees from the Brixton, Croydon, and 
Clapham riots expressed these views. Indeed, anti-
police feeling was the most prevalent theme of those 
we looked at in these locations. Participants referred 
to others in their local community as sharing similar 
hostilities, and references to 'we' and 'us', which are 
often markers of shared identity,35 littered the 
accounts of antipathy to the police. Many 
interviewees explicitly suggested that anti-police 
feelings were the motivation for themselves or for 
other participants in the riots, particularly for the 
early stages. 
In line with these attitudes, attacks on police were a 
feature of all the riots we looked at, though these 
kinds of incidents are routinely under-reported in the 
arrestee and crime data. Further, many of the initial 
attacks on property were understood by participants 
as attempts to ‘show’ the police what they could do, 
or to assert power over them. This was the case in 
the initial stages of rioting in Enfield, for example. 
30 Kawalerowicz & Biggs (2015) op. cit. show something similar, but with arrestee data. The advantage of the present analysis is it includes 
data on the actions of people who were not arrested, and is thus not subject to biases around who was apprehended. 
31 The ‘stop and search’ figures are for 2009, 2010, and January-July 2011, adjusted for borough population size. 
32 In addition, for the years 2010-2011 it was rare in any London borough that more than 1 in 10 people searched was arrested. During the 
period of enhanced searches undertaken in 2009 for Counter Terrorism purposes, these figures decreased to 1 in 20 in many boroughs. In 
Haringey, for example, only 4.8% of those stopped and searched were arrested in 2009, meaning that more than 30,000 unsuccessful
searches were made in the borough that year. 
33 Kawalerowicz & Biggs (2015) op. cit. show something similar with the same MPS survey, but using arrestee data. 
34 Newburn, T., Diski, R., Cooper, K., Deacon, R., Burch, A., & Grant, M. (2018). ‘The biggest gang’? Police and people in the 2011 
England riots. Policing and Society, 28, 205-222.  
35 Smith, L. G. E., Gavin, J., & Sharp, E. (2015). Social identity formation during the emergence of the occupy movement. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 818-832.  
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6.3.2 Experiences of ‘stop and search’ - not 
just for individuals but experienced as an 
attack on the community - were common and 
were a motivator 
In line with the statistical analysis (6.2 above), the 
interview data suggested an association between the 
riots and experiences of ‘stop and search’. Thus in 
explaining their hatred of the police or their own or 
others’ participation in the riots, a number of 
interviewees reported being previously subjected to 
police ‘stop and search’ or other humiliating forms of 
unfair police attention. A key feature of many of these 
accounts was that the humiliating treatment was of 
their community, not just themselves as an individual. 
In other words, they were experienced as an attack 
on ‘us’. 
6.3.3 Many people saw themselves in 
opposition to a societal system they perceived 
as unjust and illegitimate 
Also common in the interview transcripts, and 
sometimes linked to anti-police feelings, was a sense 
of wider illegitimacy or alienation36 that took in a 
variety of types of structural disadvantage. This made 
looting acceptable to many. Participants referred to 
cuts to youth funding, or increasing poverty, or to 
other economic disadvantages affecting young people, 
their community or reference group. Many linked 
particular disadvantages to their long-standing 
opposition to the government or the social system 
more generally. As with anti-police feelings, their 
alienation was often presented as a shared experience, 
and 'we'-talk in this context was common. 
6.3.4 ‘Postcode rivalries’ were superseded 
For many young people in London, ‘postcode 
rivalries’ shape where they feel able to go and their 
group loyalties. One of the most striking findings 
from the analysis of participant interviews, however, 
was that these long-standing hostilities were 
overcome within the riots:  
shared historical experiences of antagonism 
with police appears to have afforded an 
opportunity for these participants to 
understand that they actually shared a 
collective identity in the context of police 
disempowerment.37
In Haringey, for example, one participant described 
the looting in Wood Green as a novel positive 
experience of ‘community’ precisely because of the 
supersession of these rivalries:
A: You know what? Out of all of the whole thing, 
like, I saw communities coming together [laughs]. I 
know it’s a bad thing, for like, everyone but at the 
end of the day I saw the community coming together.
Q: How so?
A: Because like, usually, cos it’s postcode gangs and 
that lot, like Hornsey, they have differences with 
Wood Green. But then again, when the riots came, I 
saw Wood Green and Hornsey people just walking 
past each other like it was nothing like ‘oh help me 
with this’, and ‘you will get some of this’ and just 
‘help me out’ and that’s just. It brought people 
together because, now, it’s like I don’t see a problem 
with any kind of area.38
The Guardian/LSE analysis of these data has 
previously made this same point.39 However, what 
we have been able to show in addition is the way this 
supersession of postcode rivalries occurred within 
particular riot events and was part of the dynamic
whereby participants reversed the power of the 
police.40
36 Newburn, T., Deacon, R., Diski, B., Cooper, K., Grant, M., & Burch, A. (2016). ‘The best three days of my life’: Pleasure, power and 
alienation in the 2011 riots. Crime, Media, Culture, 14, 41-59.  
37 Stott C., Ball, R., Drury, J., Neville, F., Reicher, S., Boardman, A., & Choudhury, S. (2018). The evolving normative dimensions of 
‘riot’: Toward an elaborated social identity explanation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 834-849. 
38 LON1210110402: lines 451-460. 
39 Newburn, T. et al. (2011, December 6th). The four day truce: gangs suspended hostilities during the riots. Guardian. 
40 Stott et al. (2018) op. cit.
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7. How did the riots begin?
7.1 Beyond ‘any spark’ 
The ‘spark’ metaphor is one of the most common in 
the discourse of urban riots. It is often used to suggest 
that just any small incident can inflame a crowd to 
riot. But, as our previous work on the dynamics of 
riots has shown, the immediate pre-history of even 
the most violent riot is typically far more complex 
than this. Far from plunging immediately into mass 
violence, crowds and communities undertake a series 
of other actions before they resort to riot:
The Brixton riot of 1981 didn’t start after 
Michael Bailey died - believed at the time to 
have been a consequence of police brutality. It 
started the following day after the police 
responded to the incidents the night before by 
increasing foot patrols and intensifying their 
operation 'Swamp 81' involving the heavy use 
of stop and search powers. The Broadwater
Farm riot of 1985 in Tottenham didn’t start 
after Cynthia Jarrett, a black woman, died as 
police raided her house, looking for her son 
Floyd. It happened after a peaceful march and 
demonstration, led by relatives, outside the 
local police station had brought no satisfactory 
answers.41
As is now well known, the 2011 riots didn’t start 
immediately after Mark Duggan was shot and killed 
by police in Tottenham Hale. The killing took place 
on Thursday 4th August and the protest by family and 
friends at the lack of communication about the killing 
took place on Saturday 6th. The first riot began at the 
end of the protest on the Saturday.
What is more, there was a significant dynamic within 
the protest outside Tottenham police station that 
explains how the crowd became a riot, which is again 
more complex than the ‘spark’ metaphor. It was only 
at the point at which the police were seen to assault a 
young woman in the crowd that violence against them 
first became normative:42
the riot did not immediately follow the 
shooting of Mark Duggan but emerged 
following extended interactions with the 
police, characterised by failed communication 
and marginalisation of those seeking dialogue. 
… The initial confrontations arose out of the 
intergroup interactions outside Tottenham 
Police Station wherein the police were 
perceived to have acted illegitimately and 
indiscriminately against people in the crowd.43
We have shown across a range of types of crowd 
events - including football crowds, poll tax protests 
and student demonstrations - that the transition from 
a peaceful crowd event to a riot occurs through a 
clash of social-identity based definitions of legitimacy 
(e.g., ‘our’ right to protest, to have explanations) 
plus shifts in collective power from police to crowd.44
The same was true of the start of the 2011 riots.
7.2 Demographic analysis shows that in 
many cases initial confrontation 
originated in some of the more 
deprived estates 
Some examples illustrate the role of class in the 
initiation of the riots that followed Tottenham. In 
Brixton and Clapham, the initiation of rioting had a 
geographic relationship to particular deprived social 
housing estates. In Brixton, police entering the 
Moorlands Estate were attacked by a crowd which 
proceeded to drive them off and then began looting. 
Similarly in Clapham, police called to the Winstanley 
Estate, one of the most deprived estates in the 
borough, were attacked by rioters and then 
eventually forced to withdraw, at which point looting 
became prevalent. In the riot in Enfield, which took 
place on the second day of rioting (Sunday 8th), the 
profile of arrestee data reflected distinct east-west 
structural divisions in the borough. The interview and 
crime data confirm that these rioters travelled from 
poorer suburbs to the east and south. The location of 
Enfield Town was perhaps chosen because those from 
the poorer areas of the borough were aware of it as a 
frontier-town to the affluent suburbs to the west. In 
this sense, the town centre may have been an ideal 
location for a 'raid.'
41 Reicher & Stott (2011) op. cit.
42 Stott et al. (2018) op. cit. 
43 Stott et al. (2016) op cit. 
44 Reicher, S. (2001). The psychology of crowd dynamics. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: 
Group processes (pp. 182-208). Oxford: Blackwell.
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8. What do people do in a riot? 
8.1 Beyond ‘mob mentality’: Targets of 
the rioters 
The suggestion that what happened in the 2011 riots 
reflected a primitive ‘mob mentality’ was evident in 
statements that rioters ‘destroyed their own 
community’, gratuitously damaged ‘local shops’ and 
‘family businesses’, and in the references to the 
effects of arson on private properties. Yet when we 
looked closely at the Home Office’s own data we 
found a more complex picture: 
The ‘small independent retailers’ category 
(which principally comprised convenience 
shops, newsagents and off licences) so beloved 
of the media and politicians in the aftermath of 
August 2011 makes up a small minority of 9% 
of the 2,278 commercial properties that were 
attacked in total. It is also apparent that the 
vast majority of properties were targeted in 
order to obtain goods and cash, with electrical 
and clothing shops alone making up 22% of the 
total. Clearly, there was significant selectivity 
of targets rather than indiscriminate 
destruction.45
It is true, however, that in some districts it appeared 
as if every car and every shop was targeted. We found 
this to be the case in a part of Enfield borough, for 
example, and it was also true of Ealing. Here the 
targeting seemed to be by location; this ‘discriminating 
indiscrimination’, as we have named it, seems to reflect 
class hatred rather than the other two key motivations 
found in the riots (i.e., to reverse power-relations 
with police and to acquire goods). 
But what of the claims concerning the destruction of 
private dwellings? Here too the evidence was not as 
simple as suggested by the images of burning 
buildings used in so many mass media accounts to spin 
a story of random attacks on people’s homes: 
Extensive analysis of the targets of the arsonists 
and ‘rioters’ in August has demonstrated that
there were very few (if any) selective attacks on 
private homes. Take for example the figure of 
‘at least 100 families are thought to have been made 
homeless by arson and looting’46 which was 
quoted in several sources immediately after the 
August events. On closer examination this 
figure relates only two ‘riot’ locations in 
London; 55 private homes in Croydon and 45 
in Tottenham.47 Of these 100 properties, 26 
lay above the Carpetright shop in Tottenham 
and the majority (if not all) in Croydon were 
damaged by a single fire set in the Reeves 
Furniture Store to which they were adjacent. 
Thus the greater part of the instances of arson 
affecting private homes were related to two 
fires (set in nearby commercial premises) in 
only two locations. It appears from the 
evidence that peoples’ homes were not the 
primary or even secondary targets for arson by 
‘looters and rioters’ across the capital and the 
country; instead these incidents were more in 
line with the concept of (arguably non-
intentional) collateral damage.48
Lastly on this, too many accounts of damage and 
destruction assumed unitary motives in a crowd that 
was supposedly out of control. Our detailed 
examination of the data found more variability and 
complexity than this, however. Three brief examples 
will illustrate the point. First, when the initial rioting 
in Tottenham began to develop from the police focus 
to looting and other attacks on property, there were 
many in the crowd who opposed this and who wanted 
to keep the focus on the police.49 Second, both in 
Tottenham and elsewhere there were many in the 
crowd who regulated the behaviour of others by 
directing them not to set fires or to select some 
targets and no others - famously, the Blackberry 
Messenger message to ‘dead the fires’ in Enfield was 
widely respected. Finally, some of the very people 
rescuing people from fires were rioters.50
45 Ball & Drury (2012) op. cit.
46 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/families-homeless-riots-compensated. In fact, only 61 families required long-term 
alternative housing in London where the bulk of the arson occurred. Although the breakdown of this figure is unavailable it seems likely 
that the majority (if not all) of these incidents were related to the two large fires in Tottenham and Croydon (Riots, Communities and 
Victims Panel 2011 op. cit.). 
47 Only two other locations of private homes damaged by fire were mentioned in the sources, these were Southwark (London) and 
Birmingham where one household was affected in each case. The source gives no information on the former and a suggestion of a ‘racially 
motivated attack’ concerning the latter. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/families-homeless-riots-compensated
48 Ball & Drury (2012) op. cit.
49 Stott et al. (2018) op. cit.
50 See for example https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2r7j9q
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8.2 Shared alienation and hostility to 
the police were the basis of collective 
action
Research on groups has established that shared social 
identity makes collective behaviour possible,51 since it 
provides shared definitions of situations and common 
norms for acting within those situations.52 While 
interviewees were not asked directly about identity, 
there was evidence that they often saw those around 
them during the rioting as ‘us’ - as evidenced in the 
‘we’-talk. 
Some were more explicit that it was the feelings they 
shared of being alienated and against the police 
precisely that was the basis of coordinated action - as 
in this example from Brixton:  
A: everybody saw it, everyone felt the same way, 
everyone felt it was an advantage for us to do what 
we was gonna do. [ ] That teamwork, that was the 
connection everyone had.
Q. Would you have that usually amongst other 
people?
A. Nope.
Q. What do you think was special then?
A. The fact that we all felt each other’s pain. It was 
just that, that’s just the highlight of it, the fact that 
we just felt one another’s pain, and we all thought, 
rah, like it’s time to do something about it.53
Shared assumptions about who ‘we’ are (as well as 
who ‘they’ are), enables people to act as one, since it 
means they can anticipate each other’s actions and 
they expect support for actions in line with shared 
norms and values. This seems to have happened in the 
2011 riots in the different patterns of behaviour 
observed, including confronting police, looting 
(where there was evidence of cooperation among 
participants who were strangers to each other), and 
the attacks on wealth. 
51 Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization 
theory. Basil Blackwell. 
52 Reicher (1984) op. cit.
53 LON2110110828 Lines 505-517  
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9. How do riots spread?  Beyond ‘contagion’
A key aim of our programme of research was to 
examine the processes by which the 2011 riots spread. 
Since the waves of urban riots in the USA in the 
1960s, social scientists have tried to identify the 
predictors of such waves. From the 1970s onwards, 
research was able to show that, in addition to 
structural causes (such as deprivation), riots 
influenced each other: the occurrence of a riot in one 
location subsequently made rioting more likely in 
certain other locations. More recent research, using 
sophisticated modelling techniques, has shown that 
this influence process is actually one of the main 
predictors of rioting, and that the more intense the 
rioting the greater the influence.
But what is the process? Early accounts referred to 
‘contagion’, and we saw this kind of explanation 
(alongside the related notion of ‘copycat’ behaviour) 
in commentaries during the 2011 riots.54 More recent 
social science accounts reject the notion of 
mindlessness and irrationality, however. Instead, they 
suggest that influence between events can be 
explained as a ‘rational choice’ people make on seeing 
others benefit from participating in rioting.55
But both irrationalist 'contagion' and rational-actor 
models fail to explain why some people and not 
others join in with rioting and why some people are 
more influential than others in a riot. There are 
different kinds of riot spread, and our research has 
analysed a number of them, drawing on the concepts 
of identity and empowerment. 
9.1 Normative change and spread to 
contiguous locations during rioting 
We examined the spread from Tottenham to adjacent 
districts in Haringey borough, and therefore the 
initial development from a community (or anti-
police) riot to a 'commodity riot'. Police 
reinforcements dispersed the crowd north and south, 
away from Tottenham itself but closer to nearby 
retail parks. Change in crowd norms occurred from 
attacks on police to both looting and attacks on 
wealth. This took place through a 'positive feedback 
loop' of collective empowerment; in realizing their 
anti-police aims, rioters both revealed and created 
police vulnerability. This new police vulnerability was 
the premise for the new collective actions: 
The drivers of collective action subsequently 
appeared to change, and the event went 
beyond a reactive riot toward proactive rioting 
against targets that seem to relate to longer 
term structural grievances (e.g., wealth 
inequality, antagonism toward the 
'establishment'). ... this normative 
transformation corresponded with a subjective 
sense of collective agency that emerged over 
time directly from the ongoing identity-based 
intergroup dynamics of the anti-police riot on 
the High Road.56
A similar pattern occurred within the Enfield riot the 
following day, and again police dispersal played a 
role. Initially, the events in Enfield town centre were 
characterized by anti-police initiatives, such as 
damaging shops to draw police in, followed by 
looting.  The ensuing dispersal by police westwards 
into the wealthier areas of Enfield Town, and a larger 
group eastward towards the retail parks, led to 
differing behaviours beyond the initial anti-police 
action. As mentioned earlier (8.1 ‘Beyond mob 
mentality’), those travelling to the wealthier areas 
engaged in a 'class riot,’57 characterised by arson 
attacks on cars and damage to residential property, 
both identifiable as symbols of affluence. Those in the 
retail parks instead engaged in systematically looting 
the higher-end retailers of clothing and electrical 
goods with relative impunity. 
9.2 Spread of events to non-contiguous 
locations: A new explanation 
We found evidence - for example in the arrest data -
that part of the diffusion of rioting from the initial 
events in Haringey to the nearby borough of Enfield 
on day two was in terms of travelling by participants 
who had been involved in - and empowered by - the 
events in Haringey the day before. 
However, our main focus was spread between non-
contiguous locations to people who hadn’t previously 
been involved, and where there was no such 
travelling. To look at this, we analysed data from 
54 Pilkington, D. (2011, November 14th). Rioting in London sparked 'copycat' behaviour. Independent; Slutkin, G. (2011, August 14th). 
Rioting is a disease spread from person to person – the key is to stop the infection. Guardian.
55 Myers, D. (2010). Violent protest and heterogeneous diffusion processes: The spread of US racial rioting from 1964 to 1971. 
Mobilization 15(3), 289-321. 
56 Stott et al. (2018) op. cit. 
57 Ball and Drury (2012) op. cit.
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three South London locations that saw rioting in the 
days following Tottenham - Brixton, Croydon and 
Clapham (see Figure 1). There was significant 
variability in the timing of the rioting in these 
locations, which requires explanation: Brixton 
occurred the day after Haringey and was the first 
location in South London to riot; Croydon and 
Clapham happened the day after Brixton. While many 
riots took place across London on the third day of 
rioting, Croydon was the biggest riot. 
9.2.1 Shared identity and self-relevance as a 
basis of collective empowerment and spread
The killing by police of Mark Duggan had an influence 
on people beyond Tottenham, but there were 
important variations in that influence. More Brixton 
interviewees than those participating in the other 
South London riots saw the killing of Mark Duggan in 
Tottenham as relevant to their community, based on 
a common identification as Black in relation to the 
police; they were more likely to describe anger and a 
sense of injustice as their motivation for participation, 
and refer to a history of conflictual relations with 
police that was similar to that in Tottenham.  
Fewer Croydon and Clapham interviewees than 
Brixton identified with Tottenham. However, there 
was evidence from across the three locations that, 
because interviewees identified as anti-police, they 
were empowered and emboldened by perceived 
police vulnerability created in the previous riot(s) -
particularly by the Monday.  
In addition, interviewees from all three riots also 
referred to their expectations that people in their 
networks and communities would participate in 
rioting. For Croydon and Clapham interviewees more 
than Brixton participants, this expectation was based 
on this perception of police vulnerability. Where 
there was strong evidence of shared identity for 
Croydon and Clapham rioters - in the form of 'we'-
talk for example - it was within these local networks. 
The evidence of differential identification with 
Tottenham therefore helps explain the sequence of 
events - the fact that Brixton occurred on Sunday 7th 
August, while Croydon and Clapham occurred later, 
on Monday 8th. That is, while the Brixton riot was 
influenced by events in Tottenham, the Croydon 
Figure 1. Boroughs of Greater London, showing locations included in the analysis of spread in London 
Map courtesy of Richard Grove 
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and Clapham riots were more influenced by the 
totality of riots that had occurred by Sunday night. 
Given that the Reading the Riots interview sample 
were mostly riot participants, and that anti-police 
sentiment was so common amongst them, these data 
do not allow us to compare systematically with 
people who were pro-police or non-participants. 
However, given the links between anti-police 
sentiments and the forms of action in the riots, a 
reasonable hypothesis is that the people empowered 
by previous riots were those who were (a) anti-police 
and (b) had supportive anti-police networks. This 
would help explain why, while many people heard 
about the riots, only some people joined in with 
them. It is also consistent with the analysis of the 
police survey data comparing boroughs that did and 
did not riot (6.2.3 above).
9.2.2 Interaction within the group mediates 
influence of events
A further important difference between Brixton and 
the other two locations that seems to help explain the 
sequence of events was the occurrence of Splash in 
Brixton, a music festival, which brought together 
thousands of people under the theme of Black 
African-Caribbean culture, making salient the very 
identity that linked Tottenham and Brixton. At 
Splash, people not only spoke to others who shared 
the same sense of injustice as they did, they could also 
see that some of these others were ready to act on
this. While shared anger at the injustice legitimized 
participation, shared expectations of widespread
involvement empowered it. Croydon and Clapham 
interviewees’ interaction took place mostly by phone, 
social media and in small groups rather than in a 
crowd, which may have made the practical task of 
coordination slower. 
9.2.3 Power reversal of the police is the 
catalyst for mass participation and looting 
At each location we looked at, the catalyst that 
transformed minor skirmishes into full-scale rioting 
was the actions of a relatively small group initiating 
conflict with police (see 7.2, above). The secondary 
convergence of many others to the riot location 
occurred after this conflict when police were forced 
to retreat and appeared vulnerable. 
9.3 Some police tactics inadvertently 
facilitated spread 
In addition to the identity-based social influence 
processes between rioters at different events outlined 
above, there was also evidence that various police 
decisions and tactics inadvertently facilitated spread. 
For example, in Enfield, in the hours before the riots, 
police cleared the town centre, inadvertently 
signalling to potential rioters the location where 
rioting would take place. A similar process to this 
took place in Croydon and Clapham. The situation in 
Croydon was compounded by a decision to send 
police officers to other boroughs. 
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In other places, there was a different kind of process. 
In Brixton, police feared that there would be 
confrontation at the Splash event, and so police 
resources were deployed into the area. However, this 
badly backfired. On the one hand, the police 
intervention was seen as an illegitimate transgression. 
On the other hand, its ineffectualness gave people 
confidence that the police would be unable to prevent 
a riot. 
In Hackney, there was a parallel process. Police 
responded to events in other London districts over 
the weekend in a proactive manner, by targeting areas 
of Hackney they had concerns about. They not only 
increased personnel in the area, but also were 
perceived to increase ‘stop and search’ - one of the
very issues that prompted so many people to become 
involved in the previous two nights: 
If the previous riots had made many young 
people, especially black youth, more suspicious 
of them, so it is likely that they made the 
police more suspicious of those congregating 
on the streets. Moreover, in the light of 
emerging criticisms of ‘soft policing’ in 
Tottenham and elsewhere,58 the pressure on 
officers was to be more, rather than less, 
interventionist. In such a climate, it was all too 
easy for mutual distrust and expectation to 
turn into the dynamics of conflict.59
In short, some police tactics intended to prevent 
rioting seem to have facilitated rioting. 
58 For instance, a headline in the daily Telegraph on the morning of August 8th was ‘Tottenham riots: police let gangs run riot and loot’ –
see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8687540/Tottenham-riots-police-let-gangs-run-riot-and-loot.htm
59 Stott et al. (2016) op. cit.
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10.  Conclusions 
A wave of riots cannot be dismissed as a blip. Such 
events tell us about profound problems in a society. 
This is why so many waves of riots lead to policy 
responses, whether in the price of bread in eighteenth 
century France60 or in 21st century France where 
President Macron reluctantly scrapped a fuel tax 
following gilets jaunes riots.61 Riots are therefore a 
resource for learning about social groups, their 
collective power, and their psychology. 
There are three key conclusions that can be drawn 
from this work-in-progress on the social context and 
social psychology of the 2011 wave of riots.
10.1 The need for an evidence-based 
approach
It is significant, we think, that the analysis presented 
here differs markedly from those publications, 
pronouncements and policies that have been based on 
assumptions rather than evidence. Where there is 
overlap here with other analysis of the riots it is with 
those studies employing large data-sets. Both the 
mass media and politicians suggested solutions before 
they even had the evidence, leading to hasty and ill-
judged policy initiatives aimed more at saying ‘we are 
doing something’ than doing something useful. 
10.2 A new understanding of riot 
spread 
The language of ‘contagion’ is both pathologizing and 
misleading as a way of talking about the spread of 
riots, including those that took place in England in 
2011. We have argued that a new way of talking and 
thinking is needed, and our research suggests some of 
the elements of this. To talk about a wave of riots, we 
should refer not to ‘contagion’ but to ‘spread’, 
‘influence’, or ‘interdependence’. These terms are 
less loaded. They do not imply sickness, primitive 
psychology, or mindlessness. 
For the process underlying the spread of riots from 
location to location, we suggest a new model of 
identity-based collective empowerment. People are 
discriminating in who is relevant to them, who they 
attend to, who influences them, and in what they do 
in response to exposure. Their actions are based on 
their sense of who they are, who the ‘other’ is, in 
shared understandings of appropriate conduct, and 
shared expectations about social support and co-
action. We have shown that these concepts help make 
sense of the pattern of behaviour and some of the 
sequences of events. 
10.3 Implications for policy and 
practice
This programme of work is essentially about 
compiling evidence, providing the best analysis, and 
developing theory to understand the riots of 2011 and 
their spread. It is not a policy-based initiative or 
attempt to recommend future practices. 
Nevertheless, given that policy and practice requires 
evidence, and that this research programme has now 
provided significant evidence, some practical 
implications can perhaps be drawn.  A first practical 
implication is that the practice of ‘stop and search’ is 
clearly a problem not a solution. It is not going to be 
effective - except as a way of focusing the sense of 
rage and injustice felt by many young people (and 
particularly working class and Black young people) 
towards the police and towards authorities in general.  
The second practical implication is perhaps so obvious 
we should not need to spell it out here. When police 
shoot people dead, this may not lead directly to riots; 
but such events are a potent icon or symbol of wider 
relations of injustice that motivate people to riot. 
Clearly the police failure to communicate in the days 
after the killing was crucial in explaining the 
emergence of protest and then rioting in Tottenham. 
But for many people outside Tottenham (particularly 
in Brixton), it was the killing itself that was the focus; 
and it was the Brixton riot and others on the Sunday 
that empowered those that rioted on the Monday. In 
sum, without the killing, the August 2011 wave of 
riots would not have happened when they did, and 
may not have happened at all. 
60 Rudé, G. (1964). The crowd in history: A study of popular disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848. New York: Wiley. 
61 Willsher, K. (2018, December 5th). Macron scraps fuel tax rise in face of gilets jaunes protests. Guardian
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